A cryptosystem, based on computation of square roots of complex integers modulo composite n, is described in this paper. This paper provides an algorithm extracting a square root of Gaussian integer. Various properties of square roots and a method for finding Gaussian generators are demonstrated. The generators can be instrumental in constructing other cryptosystems. It is shown how to significantly reduce average complexity of decryption per each block of ciphertext.
Introduction
In recent publications public-key cryptography (PKC) algorithms are generalized in the field of complex integers that were introduced and analyzed by Carl F. Gauss 

Applications of Gaussian integers {Gaussians, for short} in PKC were extended to the RSA scheme [2] , and to ElGamal cryptosystems [3] . While groups based on real integers have cycles of order , groups based on Gaussians modulo prime p have cycles of order . In this paper is described a cryptosystem based on extractors of square roots of complex integers modulo composite n. The kernel of the proposed application is a method for extracting square roots of a Gaussian modulo k , where , and are distinct and large primes. 
 
3) If pmod4 = 3, then an integer c is either a quadratic residue (QR) with two real roots or a quadratic nonresidue (QNR). In the latter case (c, 0) is a GQR with two imaginary roots. In other words, if c is a QR, then p-c is a GQR and vice verse: if mod c p a, then
These properties yield from the identity
and from Euler criterion of quadratic residuosity [6] .
As it is demonstrated in Section 5, the 6 th property can be applied in search for a Gaussian generator.
Symbolic Rules
Many properties including (2.6)-(2.11) are easier to verify if we define a generalization of Legendre symbol [7] for Gaussian integers.
Proposition 2: If pmod4 = 3, and qmod4 = 3, then the following properties hold:
Extraction of Square Roots

Algorithm
The following algorithm describes how to extract Gaussian square roots of (c, d) if it is a GQR modulo Blum prime p.
then (c, d) does not have a square root; {end of algorithm}; else
Output two solutions  ,  
where computation of x and y in (3.13)-(3.14) requires three exponentiations (3.20) . In addition, these square roots in (3.8), (3.13) and (3.14) have four (  ) signs. Hence, there are sixteen combinations of these signs. However, not all combinations of these signs are feasible. Feasibility of these combinations is analyzed in Subsection 3.3.
Algorithm Validation
In the following discussion it is assumed that both components in (c, m prime and h be a positiv pairs are solutions of (2.4) and (2.5). An alternative extractor of square roots is provided in [8] .
Proposition 3: Let p be a Blu e integer co-prime with p. Then from Euler criterion of quadratic residuosity [6] either h or p h  , but not both, is a QR modulo p. Indeed, since   Step 2: n: = pq; n is a public key; p and ys;
Step
Encryption
Step 4 , w [5] :
Step 9:
Step 10: 
Advantages of PKC Based on Gaussian
urrently a "tail" of 64 bits is added to every block of a Integers C plaintext P in order to resolve ambiguity of Rabin decryption [10] . In the PKC based on square-roots of Gaussian integers for the same level of assurance we need to add totally 64 bits to every Gaussian integer (rather than to every real integer as in [10] 
Ambiguity in Recovery of Original
method of "tails" introduced in [10] does not always The direct computation shows that
Information and Its Elimination
